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ABSTRACT
The indictment of the Milberg Weiss law firm and two of its named partners for
allegedly making illegal payments to lead plaintiffs stands at the intersection of
important recent developments in both the expanding criminalization of corporate
conduct and the federalization of corporate law. Many have noted the irony and
hypocrisy of the Milberg firm's alleged use of illegal tactics to prosecute corporate
illegality. However, the more important hypocrisy is that Milberg's prosecutors are
essentially paying the same witness-Vogel-that Milberg is being prosecuted for
paying. This case illustrates the need to develop coherent standards regarding pay-
ments to litigants and witnesses. These standards should be based on the incentive
effects of the payments rather than on a desire to discourage or encourage particu-
lar types of actions.
Professor of Law, George Mason University Law School.
Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
MUCH ATTENTION HAS FOCUSED LATELY ON TWO IMPORTANT developments in cor-
porate and securities laws. First, there has been increasing federalization of the law
in this area. The most notable example is the broad new regulation of internal
corporate conduct in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' (SOX). Another example is
attempts to control abusive securities class actions by requiring that such actions be
brought in federal court. 2 This trend continued recently in the Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit,' which
expanded the preemptive effect of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998.4
The second important development is the increased criminalization of corporate
law.' The recent Enron related criminal trials of Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, and
the recent criminal investigations of options backdating and other compensation
issues illustrate the potentially enormous impact of criminal fraud prosecutions on
issues that have traditionally been part of internal corporate governance controlled
by state law and civil enforcement.6 Indeed, this development intersects with feder-
alization. Commentators have noted that prosecutors' use of the mail fraud and
RICO statutes to prosecute individuals for depriving another of the intangible right
to honest services "stand[s] federalism on its head" by "turning minor state crimes
and violations of non-criminal regulations into 20-year federal felonies."7 The civil
and criminal provisions contained in SOX often closely relate to and have the po-
tential to overshadow areas that were traditionally governed by state corporation
law.8
The indictment of the Milberg Weiss law firm and two of its named partners for
making and concealing alleged illegal payments to lead plaintiffs stands at the inter-
section of these important developments. First, the indictment of the leading secur-
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.); see generally HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE'VE
LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT 65-71 (AEI Press 2006).
2. See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, A Perspective on Federal Corporation Law, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 425,
425-26 (2007).
3. 547 U.S. 71 (2006). For an analysis of the case and its implications for federalism, see Larry E. Rib-
stein, Dabit, Preemption and Choice of Law, 2006 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 141 (2006).
4. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
5. For criticisms of this development, see Larry E. Ribstein, Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 J. Bus.
& TECH. L. 59 (2007). See also Howard H. Chang & David S. Evans, The Optimal Prosecution of Corporate
Fraud: An Error Cost Analysis, (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=943035.
6. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation-Why Bother?, 2 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. 277, 296-303 (2007) (discussing criminal investigations of backdating and compensation issues).
7. Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud 6. RICO Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN
BAG 113, 115 (2006); see also George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-Mail Fraud, State Law
and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225 (1997); Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and
Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117 (1987).
8. See generally BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1; Jennifer Johnson, What's Good for the Goose? A Critical
Essay on "Best Practices" for Private Firms, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 251, 253-60 (2007).
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ities class action law firm has effects that are analogous to recent federal legislation
aimed at controlling securities class actions by reducing the viability of private se-
curities class action lawsuits, at least in the short term.9 Second, this may, in turn,
increase the demand for substitutes, including expanded criminal fraud prosecu-
tions. Third, the federal prosecution of Milberg expands the federal role in this area
by turning misdemeanor violations of state law and non-criminal violations of eth-
ics laws into federal felonies.
Even more fundamentally, this Article shows that the prosecution of Milberg
shares attributes with the "abusive" class action lawsuits targeted by the Milberg
prosecution. While many commentators have focused on Milberg's hypocrisy in
allegedly using concealed kickbacks to sue firms that engaged in similar behavior,
0
the prosecutor's actions in this case are just as hypocritical. As it has done in many
cases, the government used incentive "payments" to induce the cooperation of
Howard Vogel in order to prosecute Milberg's incentive payments to Vogel to be a
lead plaintiff. The prosecutors' activities therefore facially violate the same statute
against paying witnesses that Milberg is being prosecuted for violating. Moreover,
these parallels are substantive and not cosmetic. That is, to the extent that pay-
ments to lead plaintiffs raise concerns over misaligned incentives, the same con-
cerns can apply a fortiori when used by prosecutors.
The Milberg prosecution illustrates the need for a general policy framework to
evaluate when payments to both witnesses and lead plaintiffs should be enjoined.
The payment to lead plaintiffs the Milberg prosecution attacks is a potentially effi-
cient practice because it addresses free-riding and incentive problems that would
otherwise plague class actions. Making this conduct illegal creates incentives to en-
gage in costly "arbitrage"-that is, roughly equivalent conduct that is legal, or at
least involves less detectable illegality. Moreover, perceived social needs to distin-
guish among underlying rights and wrongs involved in particular causes of action
are best met by crafting the cause of action. Trying to accomplish this result by
criminalizing litigation behavior may compromise the legitimacy and moral force
of the law by making indefensible distinctions between similar types of conduct.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II describes the Milberg indictment and
prosecution. Part III examines the effect of incentive payments to lead plaintiffs.
Part IV examines payments to witnesses, and contrasts the payments and other
considerations paid to Howard Vogel by Milberg with similar considerations given
by prosecutors to Vogel and other cooperating defendants such as Andy Fastow in
9. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2006 MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT
2 (2006), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/2005_YIR/2006FilingsMidYear-
Release.pdf#2006 (noting that class action filings for the first half of 2006 are "the lowest level of filing activity
during a six-month period since 1996, the year immediately following the adoption of the [PSLRA]").
10. See, e.g., Peter Elkind, The Fall of America's Meanest Law Firm, FORTUNE, Nov. 3, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2006/11 / 13/8393127/index.htm?postversion=20061
03111; Walter Olson, Inside Milberg's Credenza, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A12.
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the Enron case. Part V concludes by suggesting that standards regarding incentive
payments to both litigants and witnesses be based on the incentive effects of the
payments on the production of information rather than a desire to encourage
criminal actions or to discourage civil actions.
II. THE MILBERG INDICTMENT AND THE VOGEL PLEA
On May 18, 2006, a grand jury returned an indictment against Milberg partners
David J. Bershad and Steven G. Schulman, two other individuals, and the Milberg
Weiss law firm." The 102 page, twenty-count indictment alleges that from about
1981 through at least 2005, Milberg lawyers made concealed payments to named
plaintiffs in class actions and shareholder derivative actions in which Milberg
served as counsel.
2
The alleged illegal acts fall into three basic categories.' 3 The first category in-
cludes the substantive acts, the making of illegal payments to lead plaintiffs alleg-
edly in violation of federal criminal prohibitions against paying witnesses 4 and
New York state laws against commercial bribery.'" The second category includes
acts undertaken to conceal the initial acts, including lying to the judge, making
11. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, David J. Ber-
shad, Steven G. Schulman, Seymour M. Lazar, & Paul T. Seizer, No. CR 05-587(A)-DDP (C.D. Cal. May 18,
2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/milberg.pdf [hereinafter Milberg Indictment]. The
indictment also named Seymour M. Lazar, who served as the lead plaintiff in numerous Milberg class actions,
and Paul T. Selzer, who had served as Lazar's attorney.
12. Id. Count one alleges that the defendants conspired to commit the following offenses against the
United States: (a) to commit obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); (b) to make false
material declarations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a); to commit commercial bribery, violating New York
Penal Law Section 180.00 and 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1), (3); to commit mail and wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346; to make illegal payments to witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). Id.
at 24-79. Count two alleges a racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Id. at 79-81. Counts
three through eight allege mail fraud, and count nine alleges money laundering. Id. at 82-85. The Milberg
Weiss law firm is named in counts one, six through eight, and nine. Id. at 24, 84, 86. Bershad, Lazar and
Schulman are named in counts one, two, and six through eight. Id. at 24, 79, 84. Only Bershad and Lazar are
named in count nine. Id. at 86. Counts three through five simply name Lazar. Id. at 83. In addition, counts ten
through thirteen name Lazar and Seizer, alleging concealment of money laundering. Id. at 90. Counts fourteen
through sixteen only name Lazar for filing of a false tax return and for obstruction of justice. Id. at 92. Counts
eighteen through twenty are criminal forfeiture counts. Id. at 94- 102.
13. For a detailed discussion of these issues and the Milberg indictment generally, see Theresa A.
Gabaldon, Milberg Weiss: Of Studied Indifference and Dying of Shame, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 207 (2007).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2000); see infra Part IV.
15. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00 (Consol. 1999). This section provides that commercial bribing in the second
degree is a class A misdemeanor, and this section states that
[a] person is guilty of commercial bribing in the second degree when he confers, or offers or agrees
to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter's
employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's
affairs.
The activity can be raised to a class E felony under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.03. This section provides that
commercial bribing is in the first degree when "the value of the benefit conferred or offered or agreed to be
conferred exceeds one thousand dollars and causes economic harm to the employer or principal in an amount
exceeding two hundred fifty dollars."
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false declarations, falsifying tax documents, obstructing of justice, and laundering
money. In the final category are "derivative crimes," such as conspiracy, RICO, mail
and wire fraud, aiding and abetting, and forfeiture counts. We focus on the sub-
stantive acts in the first category. This focus does not imply that the derivative acts
are inconsequential and of little social harm. Rather, in our view, they illustrate the
serious costs that result from attempts to avoid regulations of payments to wit-
nesses and lead plaintiffs. The important issue of entity liability, which is the focus
of much of the criticism of the prosecution,'6 is beyond the scope of this Article.
Payments to lead plaintiffs are limited by law and ethics rules. As the Milberg
indictment notes,
The compensation that may be paid to a named plaintiff in a class action or
shareholder derivative action is limited to the following: (a) the named plain-
tiffs pro rata share of the recovery obtained in a lawsuit, calculated on the
same basis as the pro rata shares available to all of the absent class members or
shareholders; and (b) his or her reasonable costs and expenses incurred in con-
nection with the lawsuit, as approved by the court. Additionally, in some cir-
cumstances, the court presiding over such a lawsuit may award a modest bonus
payment to the named plaintiff, in recognition of his or her effort in obtaining
a beneficial result for the absent class members or shareholders, and only after
the absent class members or shareholders have an opportunity to object to the
bonus award.'7
Moreover, for actions filed after December 22, 1995, payment of bonus awards to
lead plaintiffs is precluded under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA).Y The indictment states that the
kickback payments to the Paid Plaintiffs were illegal and improper for the fol-
lowing reasons, among others: (a) under applicable New York law, it is a crim-
inal offense for an attorney to promise or give anything of value to induce a
person to bring a lawsuit, or to reward a person for having done so; (b) under
applicable New York law, it is a criminal offense to pay a fiduciary, without
16. See generally Gabaldon, supra note 13.
17. Milberg Indictment, supra note 11, 24, at 9- 10.
18. Under the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4),
[tihe share of any final judgment or of any settlement that is awarded to a representative party
serving on behalf ofa class shall be equal, on a per share basis, to the portion of the final judgment or
settlement awarded to all other members of the class. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
limit the award of reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the repre-
sentation of the class to any representative party serving on behalf of a class.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi), lead plaintiffs must file a sworn certification with the complaint that
"states that the plaintiff will not accept any payment for serving as a representative party on behalf of a class
beyond the plaintiff's pro rata share of any recovery, except as ordered or approved by the court in accordance
with paragraph (4)."
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consent of those to whom he or she owes fiduciary duties, with the intent to
influence his or her conduct as a fiduciary; and (c) under applicable New York
and California laws, lawyers may not share attorney's fees with persons who
are not duly licensed to practice law.'9
In addition, both count one (conspiracy) and count two (racketeering conspiracy)
of the indictment allege that the payments violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), which
prohibits payments to witnesses.2 °
The indictments allege that the payments caused a conflict of interest between
the lead plaintiff and the other class members to whom they owed fiduciary duties.
In economic terms, the indictment alleges that Milberg's paying of a portion of its
attorney's fees to the lead plaintiff increased the agency costs between the lead
plaintiff, Milberg, and the class. 2 As a result, the share of fees paid to Milberg and
the lead plaintiff out of the common recovery funds increased.22 Moreover, disclo-
sure of the payments could have affected the certification of the class.23
Central to the successful indictment was the cooperation of Howard Vogel, who
had previously served as a lead plaintiff for Milberg.24 In late April, 2006, Vogel
entered into a plea agreement with the Milberg prosecutors. 25 Pursuant to the plea
agreement, Vogel pled guilty to one count of making a false declaration before a
court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), agreed to a United States Sentencing
Guidelines offense level of seventeen minus a three level decrease for "acceptance of
responsibility,"26 and agreed to pay a $2 million dollar fine. The Vogel plea also
includes the typical agreement to "cooperate fully ... with respect to any investiga-
tions of criminal, civil, disciplinary, or other proceedings relating to any payment
19. Milberg Indictment, supra note 11, 5 29, at 11- 12.
20. Id. 41-f, at 26, 5 56-e, at 81.
21. Lead plaintiffs were alleged to have been promised "a substantial portion of the attorney's fees MIL-
BERG WEISS obtained in actions in which the individual served, or caused a relative or associate to serve, as
named plaintiff for MILBERG WEISS." Id. 5 27, at 10-11.
22. The paid plaintiffs
had a greater interest in maximizing the amount of attorneys' fees paid to MILBERG WEISS than in
maximizing the net recovery to the absent class members and shareholders.... Additionally, MIL-
BERG WEISS improperly favored the financial interests of the paid plaintiffs or their spouses or
associated entities over the interested class members or shareholders.
Id. 45, at 27-28.
23. Specifically, if the secret payments alter the paid plaintiffs' incentives, the payments may make the paid
plaintiff's claims atypical and in conflict with the interests of absent class members. See id. 5 17, at 6-7; see also
FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a) (setting out prerequisites to a class action).
24. See Elkind, supra note 10.
25. Plea Agreement for Defendant Howard J. Vogel, United States v. Howard J. Vogel, No. CR 06-00320
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/plea.pdf [hereinafter Vogel Plea
Agreement ].
26. Id. 14, at 5-6. The base offense level is twelve, with enhancements for substantial interference with
the administration of justice (three levels) and abuse of a position of trust (two levels). See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.3 (2005). A level fourteen offense level yields a guidelines sentence of fourteen to
twenty-one months for a defendant with the lowest criminal history category. Id. § 5A.l sent. table (1995).
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made directly or indirectly to any named plaintiff in any class action or shareholder
derivative lawsuit brought by the law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman
LLP."27 Cooperation requires the defendant to, among other things, "respond
truthfully and completely to all questions that may be put to defendant, whether in
interviews, before a grand jury, or at any trial or other court proceeding."2
The prosecutor agreed not to prosecute certain related offenses, to conditionally
notify the court of Vogel's cooperation and substantial assistance, and to move for
various sentence reductions. Among other things, the prosecutor agrees "[n]ot to
further prosecute defendant for violations of federal law arising out of defendant's
conduct [described in the plea agreement]"; to provide written confirmation that
the defendant will not be prosecuted for any related criminal tax violations; "if
requested by defendant, to bring to the court's attention the nature and extent of
defendant's cooperation, in connection with his sentencing"; "[ilf the USAO deter-
mines, in its exclusive judgment, that the defendant has both complied with his
obligations under [the plea agreement] and provided substantial assistance to law
enforcement in the prosecution or investigation of another ("substantial assis-
tance"), to move the Court pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 5K1.1"; "to fix an offense level and corresponding guideline range below that
otherwise advised by the sentencing guidelines"; "to recommend a sentence within
this reduced range"; "to recommend that defendant be sentenced to the low-end of
defendant's applicable sentencing guidelines range"; and to recommend that "the
defendant not be ordered to pay a fine amount higher than the low end of defen-
dant's applicable guideline fine range. 29
III. INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO LEAD PLAINTIFFS
This Part briefly examines the economic function of payments to lead plaintiffs.
While the indictment highlights the potential increased agency costs generated by
payments to lead plaintiffs, Subpart A shows that any such effect is likely to be de
minimus, and thus an implausible explanation for the practice. Subpart B examines
alternative explanations for the practices. The point is not to defend Milberg's al-
leged behavior. For example, even if Milberg did not commit theft, it may have
breached fiduciary duties and deprived absent class members of the intangible right
to honest services by concealing the payments." However, this only reinforces our
point that making the underlying conduct illegal creates incentives to conceal. It
then becomes more important to find some rationale for barring the underlying
conduct.
27. Vogel Plea Agreement, supra note 25, 5 19, at 7-9.
28. Id. 1 23, at 12-14.
29. Id.
30. See Posting of Peter J. Henning, Is It Fraud or Dishonesty in the Milberg Weiss Prosecution, to White
Collar Crime Profs Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/05/is-it_fraud or-
.html (May 20, 2006).
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A. Did the Payments Harm Absent Class Members?
It is far from clear that paying lead plaintiffs harms class members or serves to
transfer the proceeds of the common fund to Milberg and the paid lead plaintiff.
To see this, consider the division of fees in a common fund class action. Assume
that the size of the common fund CF is determined by negotiations between the
class counsel and the defendant, and that the defendant is only concerned about
the total payout, and not how it is distributed between the members of the class
and its counsel. Under these assumptions, whether or not the Milberg payments to
the lead plaintiff are disclosed should not affect the outcome of the negotiations to
determine CF if the payments do not affect the underlying merits of the case.3'
This can be seen by developing a simple model of payments to plaintiffs. Any
common fund would be apportioned between the pro-rata class recovery, R, addi-
tional recovery for the lead plaintiff, B, and the attorney's fee, F:
CF = R + (B + F).
In the absence of any expectation of a bonus payment or kickback, the lead
plaintiff expects a pro-rata share of the recovery R net of his costs of being the lead
plaintiff minus reimbursable reasonable costs and expenses (c - e). Thus,
LP° = k/N*R - (c - e)
where N is the number of outstanding affected shares, and k is the number of
affected shares owned by the plaintiff. In the absence of the kickbacks, the lead
plaintiff's payoff increases as R increases.
Now suppose that the lead plaintiff is promised or otherwise expects a bonus, B,
equal to a percentage, a, of the fee award F. The lead plaintiffs expected payoff is
now
LP = k/N * R + aF - (c - e) = (k/N - a)R + a(CF) - (c-e).
The lead plaintiffs marginal incentives to increase R are now equal to k/N-a < ki
N. Moreover, if the plaintiffs pro rata share k/N is small, then the lead plaintiff's
payoff will be decreasing in R and increasing in F. Thus, this analysis suggests that a
compensated lead plaintiff will sacrifice R in favor of F.
It is unlikely, however, that any such effect is the reason for the payments. The
prosecutor's theory assumes that the class representative effectively constrains the
fee award given to the lead counsel. In that case, the payments might persuade the
plaintiff to consent to higher fees. But as long as k is a small proportion of N, the
lead plaintiff has little incentive to increase R. Indeed, one of the reasons for the
lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA was to attempt to replace such ineffective
non-institutional lead plaintiffs with larger institutional lead plaintiffs. 2 Thus, it is
31. This assumption would not hold if disclosure of the payments to the lead plaintiff lowered the
probability that the class would be certified, which should reduce CF. Thus, with respect to the size of the
common fund, non-disclosure of the payments should not harm absent class members.
32. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46 ARIz. L. REV.
733, 771-75 (2004) (discussing lead plaintiff provisions of PSLRA).
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not clear that the payments to non-institutional lead plaintiffs such as Vogel effec-
tively increased agency costs or caused any economic harm to the absent class
members.
Moreover, the prosecutor's theory does not take into account the fact that the
size of the attorney's fee must be approved by the judge presiding over the case, and
that the size of the attorney's fee award in such cases depends mainly on the client's
recovery.33 Eisenberg & Miller found that the "dominance of the client's recovery as
a determinant of the fee is nearly complete," and that the "relation between fees and
recovery is remarkably linear on a log scale."34 The size of the award dominates
effort or cost-based measures such as the lodestar in explaining fee awards. They
also do not find that the presence of objectors to the fee award has any discernable
effect on the size of the award, or any decrease in fees in securities class actions
after the PSLRA was enacted. 5
These findings suggest that judges mainly base attorneys' fee awards on a per-
centage of the recovery, with the percentage p determined by a standard sliding
scale. Under the assumption that the judge fixes p based on the characteristics of
the recovery, a non-compensated lead plaintiff will expect to recover
LP2 = k/N*(1-p)R - (c-e).
By contrast, a lead plaintiff that expects to be paid an additional bonus equal to
aF would expect to recover
LP'3 = k/N*(1-p)R + paR = R(k/N + p(a - k/N)) - (c-e).
Comparing LP3 and LP2 , compensating the lead plaintiff increases the lead
plaintiffs incentive to raise R because a higher R produces a higher F and therefore
a higher bonus. Thus, under these assumptions, paying the lead plaintiffs a portion
of the attorney's fees would not result in lower recoveries by absent class members.
Rather, the class attorney would internalize the cost of the payment to the lead
plaintiff.
B. Why Lead Plaintiffs?
If payments of a portion of the attorney's legal fees are not being used to transfer a
larger portion of a fixed common fund to the lawyer and lead plaintiff, why would
the lawyer and lead plaintiff agree to such payments? In this section, we show that
such payments can serve to reduce agency costs, solve collective action problems,
and increase the recovery of class members. Rather than viewing the payments as a
way to enact wealth transfers in a zero-sum game, we show that such payments can
be used to increase the payoff to class members by increasing the probability that
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (setting out procedures for court approval of fees).
34. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study,
1 j. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (2004).
35. Id. at 66-68.
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viable actions are filed in the first place. 6 Thus, in contrast to the theory contained
in the Milberg indictment that these payments facilitate self-interested behavior by
class counsel, payments to lead plaintiffs can be used to reduce, rather than in-
crease, agency costs. If so, these payments can increase the expected recovery by
absent class members.
There are several reasons why incentive awards to class plaintiffs may be effi-
cient. 7 First, bonus payments can solve free-rider and collective action problems.
Class members rationally will refuse to serve as lead plaintiffs if they are limited to
a pro-rata share of the net recovery. Their non-reimbursable costs can outweigh
any expected pro-rata recovery, so that LP < 0. More importantly, even if LP° > 0,
the class member will be better off by (c - e) as long as someone else serves as the
lead plaintiff. This free-rider problem and the resulting difficulty in finding a suita-
ble lead plaintiff can prevent the filing of some class action lawsuits.
Payments to lead plaintiffs can mitigate these free-riding and collective action
problems by, for example, reimbursing lead plaintiffs for non-pecuniary litigation
costs. Even if these payments cause increased agency costs between the lead plaintiff
and absent class members, class members are better off if solving the free-rider
problem leads to more actions being filed.3" Bonus payments can also reduce
agency costs by rewarding class representatives for superior service, thus inducing
the lead plaintiff to take actions that increase the probability and size of the class
recovery. Payments can also achieve proportionality between awards and other out-
comes, such as costs or attorney's fees.
Eisenberg & Miller's empirical study of court-granted bonus awards to lead
plaintiffs in class actions finds little support for the attorney self-interest explana-
tion of payments to lead plaintiffs. In contrast, they find evidence consistent with
using these payments to solve the collective action and free-rider problems, by re-
imbursing lead plaintiffs for non-pecuniary costs.39 Eisenberg & Miller also find a
strong association between lead plaintiff bonus awards and the size of the class
36. Moreover, payments that induce the filing of class action lawsuits can be socially productive even if the
payments redistribute a portion of the recovery from absent class members to the lead plaintiff and class
counsel. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105-06 (2006) (noting deterrence function of law-
suits can be separated from compensation function).
37. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical
Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1307 (2006) (discussing these reasons).
38. Consistent with this hypothesis, one of the lawsuit deterring features of the PSLRA is to prevent the
payment of bonuses to lead plaintiffs. See 15 U.S.C. § 78v-4(a)(2)(a)(vi) (2006).
39. For example, Eisenberg & Miller find frequent use of bonus awards in cases where average recoveries
are low (e.g., consumer credit cases), which is consistent with a desire to ensure that the lead plaintiff does not
incur a net loss as a result of his service to the class. In addition, the large incentive awards observed in
employment discrimination cases, which exhibit high average recoveries, are consistent with compensating
such plaintiffs for the risk of retaliation from their employers. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 37, at 1308,
1324- 25.
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recovery, attorney's fee and expenses awarded in settlement." Thus, court-awarded
bonus payments have a structure similar to those used by Milberg to pay Vogel and
the other paid plaintiffs.
The prior analysis shows how payments to class plaintiffs can benefit class plain-
tiffs by reducing agency costs. However, court-awarded bonus payments are not
allowed in post-PSLRA securities cases. Milberg allegedly used direct payments
even in pre-PSLRA cases, perhaps because court awards in securities cases were
insufficient or too uncertain to solve the free-riding and collective action
problems.' In any event, legislative or judicial rules preventing sufficient awards
clearly increase lawyers' incentives to engage in illegal behavior in order to solve the
free-rider problem with lead plaintiffs. The illegality of this behavior, in turn, trig-
gers efforts to conceal the payments and the demand for more remedies, including
federal criminal sanctions, to prevent such arbitrage."
IV. PAYING WITNESSES
The analysis in the prior section shows that the prosecutor's theory of harm to
absent class action members is implausible. Moreover, there are plausible efficiency
reasons for making payments to lead plaintiffs. However, there may be other costs
to allowing payments to litigants. For example, allowing the payments may create
an appearance of impropriety by compromising the integrity of the participants
and thereby reduce the normative force of law.
Indeed, the indictment alleges that Milberg violated a federal bribery statute that
does not require that the payments were made for corrupt purposes. In counts one
and two of the indictment, the defendants are alleged to have agreed
to make illegal payments to a witness by giving, offering, and promising money
to the Paid Plaintiffs, for and because of the testimony under oath of affirma-
tion given and to be given by the Paid Plaintiffs as a witness upon a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding before a court authorized by the laws of the
United States to hear evidence or take testimony in the Lawsuits, filed or liti-
40. Id. at 1334-35; Richard A. Nagareda, Restitution, Rent Extraction, and Class Representatives: Implica-
tions of Incentive Awards, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1483, 1494- 96 (2006).
41. Eisenberg & Miller found bonus payments in pre-PSLRA cases were relatively infrequent (used in 24
percent of cases) and of modest amounts. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 37, at 1308. Another potential reason
for such payments is to bond the lead plaintiff to the lawyer in order to prevent client free-riding on efforts of
the lawyer. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 32, at 768-71.
42. But see Richard A. Booth, Why Pay a Fraud Plaintiff to Sue?, WASHINGTONPosT.COM, June 26, 2006, http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/25/AR2006062500527.html. The problem of ineffi-
cient lawsuits is a real and serious one. However, it is not clear that the solution to such problem lies in
procedural rules that raise the cost of all lawsuits. Rather, the solution is substantive reform which lowers the
gain from bringing inefficient actions.
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gated in federal courts, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
201 (c)(2).4
3
The bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) states that
[w]hoever . .. directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value
to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given
or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, before any court.., authorized by the laws of the United States to
hear evidence or take testimony, or for or because of such person's absence
therefrom . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than
two years, or both.
Clearly, the law requires only the appearance of corruption, and not that such
payments were made corruptly or with intent to influence the testimony.44
This statute is of interest for two main reasons. First, it is the only federal crimi-
nal statute cited in the Milberg indictment that directly regulates the substantive
conduct involved in the Milberg case. Moreover, since application of the statute
does not require that the payments were made with bad intent or were concealed, if
the statute applies to the Milberg case it would also preclude disclosed payments to
lead plaintiffs even in the absence of other criminal, civil or ethical prohibitions
against such payment.
Second, the statute facially applies to the U.S. Attorney's promises contained in
the Vogel plea agreement. Thus, this suggests that if 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) applies
to Milberg's payments to Vogel, it might also apply to the federal prosecutor's plea
agreement with Vogel.45
The issue of whether 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) applies to the standard practice of
giving leniency in exchange for testimony was addressed in United States v. Single-
43. See Milberg Indictment, supra note 11, 5 41, at 25-26.
44. Such corrupt payments to witnesses could be charged under similarly structured IS U.S.C.
§ 201(b)(3), which subjects the violator to greater punishment. This section reads as
[wihoever . . . directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any
person, or offers or promises such person to give anything of value to any other person or entity,
with intent to influence the testimony under oath or affirmation of such first-mentioned person as a
witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court . . . authorized by the laws of the
United States to hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence such person to absent
himself therefrom . . . shall be fined under this title for not more than three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years,
or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
States.
Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) would be punished under United States Sentencing Guidelines section
2J1.3, which has a base offense level of fourteen. In contrast, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) would be
punished under United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2J1.9, which has a base offense level of six.
45. J. Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness, Why is it OK for the Prosecution, but not the Defense?, 11 CRIM.
JUST. 20 (1997).
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ton (Singleton I).46 In this case, the defendant, Sonya Singleton, was convicted at
trial for one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and seven counts of money
laundering. Central to the prosecution's case was the testimony of Napoleon Doug-
las, who testified against Singleton at trial. Like Vogel in Milberg, Douglas had
entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to cooperate with the prosecution
in exchange for leniency. Specifically, in "consideration" of his promise to testify
truthfully in federal and/or state court, the prosecutor promised that Douglas
would not be prosecuted "for any other violations of the Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act stemming from his activities currently under investigation, except
perjury or related offenses," and that he would advise both the Mississippi parole
board and the sentencing court, prior to sentencing, of the nature and extent of the
cooperation provided by Mr. Douglas.47 Singleton's attorney argued on appeal that
the conviction should be overturned because of the district court's refusal to ex-
clude the testimony of Douglas, which was obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(2) and the Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b). 48
In a decision that was described as a "bombshell" and the "new Miranda," 9 the
panel in Singleton I reversed the conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial,
ordering the exclusion of Douglas' testimony. The panel found that the term "who-
ever," and thus the statute, applied to U.S. Attorneys, holding that the prosecutor's
actions did not fall within the limited set of circumstances recognized by the Su-
preme Court where statutes do not apply to the government or affect governmental
rights unless the text expressly includes the government."0 Specifically, the panel
noted that while statutes "which would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or
established prerogative title or interest" would imply a government exception, the
exception did not apply "where the operation of the law is upon the agents or
servants of the government rather than on the sovereign itself' or when the "stat-
ute's purpose is to prevent fraud, injury, or wrong."" Thus, the term "whoever"
included prosecutors because prosecutors were agents of the government, and be-
cause the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2) was to prevent the "wrong" of bribery.
The court also rejected a second reason for a government exception-that the
statute would create an absurdity if applied to the government. The court found
that "the statute's application to government officials, far from being absurd, is at
46. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banr, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
47. Id. at 1344.
48. Kansas uses Model Rule 3.4, which simply states that an attorney "shall not.., offer an inducement to
a witness that is prohibited by law." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2006). Federal law subjects U.S.
Attorneys to state ethics rules. See McDade Amendment to the Omnibus Consolidated and Energy Supplemen-
tal Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. A, Sec. 101(b), tit. VIII, § 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2000)).
49. Jeffrey M. Schumm, Courts Rush to Extinguish Singleton, But are the Embers of the Panel's Decision Still
Glowing?, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 325 (1999).
50. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) (holding that the term "anyone" in a wiretap
statute applied to federal law enforcement agents).
51. Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1346.
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the center of our legal tradition." The court noted the payments for testimony were
not necessary because "[e]very citizen has the legal duty to testify to facts within his
knowledge, and any witness may be compelled to do so by subpoena and civil
contempt proceedings." 2 The court also noted that the "judicial process is tainted
and justice cheapened when factual testimony is purchased, whether with leniency
or money. Because prosecutors bear a weighty responsibility to do justice and ob-
serve the law in the course of a prosecution, it is particularly appropriate to apply
the strictures of § 201(c)(2) to their activities." 3
The reaction to the Singleton I decision was swift. The decision led to a flood of
similar challenges and appeals. But these challenges were met with a near unani-
mous rejection of Singleton I's holding. 4 Moreover, because the decision
threatened to jeopardize numerous previous convictions and ongoing prosecutions,
the Tenth Circuit agreed to vacate the panel's decision ten days after the opinion
was issued, and agreed to hear the case en banc. In a 9-3 decision, the en banc
court in Singleton II affirmed the convictions, with seven judges holding that the
word "whoever" does not include the United States acting in its sovereign capacity,
and thus does not include an Assistant United States Attorney acting as the alter
ego of the United States in offering leniency to a criminal accomplice in exchange
for truthful testimony.5 Further, because the "ingrained practice of granting leni-
ence in exchange for testimony has created a vested sovereign prerogative in the
government," applying the statute to the government would deprive the sovereign
of a recognized or established prerogative, title, or interest.5 6
52. Id. at 1347.
53. Id.
54. See United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 197 (ist Cit. 1999); United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110,
118-119 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Hunte, 193 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Richardson, 195
F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Boyd, 168
F.3d 1077, 1078 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1124 (1lth Cir. 1999); United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 (D.C. Cir.
1999); United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1998).
The only reported exceptions are United States v. Fraguela, 1998 WL 560352 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998), vacated,
No. Crim. A. 96-0339, 1998 WL 910219, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1998) and United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp.
2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd, 166 F.3d 1119 (11 th Cir. 1999). In addition, an unreported decision favorable to
Singleton I, United States v. Mays, No. 97-CR-127 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 1998), is cited in Ramsey, 165 F.3d at
987.
55. United States v. Singleton (Singleton 1I), 165 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 1301. For a discussion of the costs and benefits of exchanges of leniency for testimony, see
generally Bruce H. Kobayashi, Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for 'Unfair' Plea Bargains,
23 R N&D J. EcoN. 507 (1992); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIo ST. L.I. 69 (1995); Daniel C.
Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED.
SENT'G REP. 292 (1996); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563 (1999). The
federal government also has set up specific reward and punishment systems to encourage reporting of wrong-
doing and, in some cases, the filing of lawsuits. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty:
An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 715 (2001) (discussing Antitrust Amnesty Program); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outside
Trading as an Incentive Device, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 21, 66-70 (2006) (discussing whistleblower laws); Rich-
ard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV.
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Critics have described Singleton II as "very result oriented" and noted the court's
"strained" interpretation of the term "whoever.""7 Even those who might agree with
the outcome note that any such modification should have been left to the legisla-
ture." Indeed, many of the post-Singleton II analyses find merit in Judge Lucero's
concurrence. 9 Judge Lucero rejected the majority's strained interpretation of the
term "whoever" and agreed with the panel that the term included the U.S. Attor-
ney.' ° Lucero noted that the majority's definitions would imply the obvious absurd-
ity that the prosecutor could pay cash, or even violate the identically structured 18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(3).6 Lucero emphasized instead that application of 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(2) to the prosecutor's exchange of leniency for testimony would conflict
with several federal statutes and rules, including portions of the Sentencing Reform
Act and Sentencing Guidelines,62 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.l(a)(2),
the Federal Immunity Statute,63 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1(e).64
1107; Elizabeth Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate Governance Provisions of
Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, EMp. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. (forthcoming), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=930226 (discussing punitive approaches to whistleblowing contained in SOX).
57. Chad Baruch, Through the Looking Glass: A Brief Comment on the Short Life and Unhappy Demise of the
Singleton Rule, 27 N. Ky. L. REV. 841 (2000); Camille Knight, The Federal Bribery Statue and the Ethics of
Purchasing Testimony, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209 (1999); A. Jack Finklea, Note, Leniency in Exchange for
Testimony: Bribery or Effective Prosecution?, 33 IND. L. REV. 957 (2000); Melissa W. Rawlinson, Note, United
States v. Singleton and the Witness Gratuity Statute: What is the Best Approach for the Criminal Justice System?,
14 BYU I. PuB. L. 227, 244 (2000). But see Eric S. Lasky, Note, Perplexing Problems with Plain Meaning, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 891 (1999) (criticizing plain meaning analysis of Singleton I panel).
58. See, e.g., Schumm, supra note 49, at 329, 347. Indeed, in the wake of the Singleton I decision, legislation
was introduced in Congress on July 15, 2006 that would have amended 18 U.S.C. § 201 to include the following
clause:
(a) IN GENERAL-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in section 201 of title 18,
United States Code, or any other provision of law, shall be construed to prohibit any otherwise lawful
giving, promising, or offering by a prosecutor of leniency, witness protection, or any other thing of
value within the reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in exchange for the testimony of any
person, including any-
(1) offer or grant of immunity for prosecution;
(2) offer to advise a court or parole board of the extent of the cooperation by the person with
the prosecutor, or any advice so given; or
(3) plea bargain agreement.
Effective Prosecution and Public Safety Act, S. 2311, 105th Cong. (1998). See James P. Dowden, Note, United
States v. Singleton: A Warning Shot Heard 'Round the Circuits?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 897, 924- 26 (1999) (discussing
introduction of the Effective Prosecution and Public Safety Act); see also James M. Lungstrum, Note, United
States v. Singleton: Bad Law Made in the Name of a Good Cause, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 749 (1999). The legislation
was not passed, as the subsequent and unanimous action of the circuit courts eliminated the pressing need for
the amendment.
59. Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1303 (Lucero, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 1303-05.
61. Id. at 1305.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05.
64. Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1306-07 (Lucero, J., concurring).
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Where specific statutes conflicted with the general prohibitions of § 201(c)(2),
Judge Lucero reasoned that the specific statutes should control.6"
A more serious examination of § 201(c)(2) and conflicting statutes suggests
some principles for discerning the scope and limits of such a statute. For example,
exceptions to the prohibition of witness payments under § 201(c)(2) could be al-
lowed where the testimony could not otherwise be compelled. For example, the
immunity statute allows removal of a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege, restor-
ing the prosecutor's ability to compel the testimony. Similarly, the exception con-
tained in 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) that allows the payment of a reasonable fee paid in
exchange for expert testimony6 also applies to a setting where admissible testimony
could not otherwise be compelled.67 This would distinguish the immunity statute
and payments to experts from payments to witnesses that could be legally com-
pelled to testify. Moreover, the apparent conflicts with the provisions of the sen-
tencing guidelines provisions for downward departures under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1, and the plea provision of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 (e), suggest the need for court supervision of any deals, and may dif-
ferentiate leniency in sentencing from promises not to prosecute.6
The major problem with Singleton II's alter ego analysis is the absence of any
type of substantive analysis of the practice and possible conflicts.69 This is especially
problematic given that the court's alter ego analysis is only a judicially created and
ad hoc public policy exception to § 201(c)(2). For example, the Singleton II major-
ity suggests that payment of cash for testimony would bring the prosecutor under
§ 201(c)(2) because the prosecutor "who offers something other than a concession
normally granted by the government," such as paying cash or bribing a witness to
65. See id. at 1303 ("Whereas the majority considers these statutes to be unnecessary to its result, see Maj.
Op. at 1302, 1 find them dispositive.").
66. 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) provides:
[p]aragraph ... (2) . .. of subsection (c) shall not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of
witness fees provided by law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and
receipt by a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable
value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding, or in the case of expert
witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent in the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and
testifying.
67. In the normal case, an expert witness's opinion testimony will require the expert to undertake effort in
order to meet the admissibility standards set out for such testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Thus,
an expert's admissible opinion testimony differs from an ordinary witness's lay testimony as to facts within his
knowledge. Moreover, the ability of such testimony is highly regulated by the trial court. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (expanding the trial judge's gatekeeping role in determining whether
such expert testimony meets the standards for admissibility under Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 702, and
703).
68. See United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (noting the importance ofjudge
intermediation); see also Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1303 (noting promises not to prosecute are not in exchange
for testimony, but rather in consideration for a plea of guilty (and the avoidance of trial and other costs) to the
six counts).
69. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1302 (noting that "[wie simply believe the general principles we have set
forth so completely undercut defendant's reading that further exposition would be redundant").
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provide false testimony, would no longer be "the alter ego of the sovereign and is
divested of the protective mantle of the government."" But, Singleton II provides
no guidance to determine when these normal conditions exist, or what, if any,
limits are placed on prosecutors' behavior.7 Indeed, some federal appeals courts
have allowed prosecutors and law enforcement officers to pay witnesses cash in
exchange for testimony.7
A serious analysis also would facilitate a more general discussion of the conse-
quences of a rule barring prosecutors from buying testimony, and thus help in
analyzing what limits should be placed on prosecutors offering inducements in
exchange for testimony. Many of the post-Singleton II analyses focus on the imbal-
ance in favor of the prosecutor. Commentators have suggested legislative reforms
that would address this imbalance, including the mutual application or repeal of
§ 201(c)(2)," limiting the prosecutor's ability to make contingent plea agree-
ments,74 or increasing judicial oversight of prosecutors.
There has also been criticism of Singleton L7 In its concern over the costs of false
convictions, that opinion may not have properly balanced the costs of letting guilty
defendants go free. Witnesses may face significant disincentives, including social
stigma or fear of extralegal punishment or retribution, which justifies paying them
for testimony.76 But as noted in the many commentaries following the Singleton
decisions, any considerations that apply to the prosecutor would also apply to use
70. Id. at 1307.
71. From a policy standpoint, the primary issue is not about the power of government but about the need
to discipline agency costs within the government, just as those between class lawyers and the class. Recent
actions and controversies illustrate that government agency costs may be as serious as agency costs between
class counsel and the class. A notable example is the government's use of discretion in charging an accounting
firm to effectively coerce cooperation by its employees by denying them the funds necessary for their defense.
See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Larry E. Ribstein, The Primacy of Contract,
TECH CENTRAL STATION DAILY, July 6, 2006, http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=070606E (discussing
Stein).
72. United States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138,
144-45 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Albanese, 195 F.3d 389, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Harris, 193 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 1999).
73. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, No Sauce for the Gander: Valuable Consideration for Helpful Testimony from
Tainted Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 790-92 (2002) (arguing for mutual application
or the repeal of the statute); Korin K. Ewing, Note, Establishing an Equal Playing Field for Criminal Defendants
in the Aftermath of United States v. Singleton, 49 DUKE L.J. 1371, 1373-74 (2000) (noting flaws in both Single-
ton I and Singleton II approaches, and arguing that the same rules should apply to defendants and prosecutors);
James W. Haldin, Note, Toward a Level Playing Field: Challenges to Accomplice Testimony in the Wake of United
States v. Singleton, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515 (2000) (suggesting that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 be used to
exclude unreliable purchased testimony in the absence of legislation).
74. Timothy Hollis, Note, An Offer You Can't Refuse? United States v. Singleton and the Effects of Witness!
Prosecution Agreements, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 433 (2000).
75. See generally Frank 0. Bowman, IlI, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on "Sub-
stantial Assistance" Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7 (1999).
76. Thus, on public policy grounds, payments or things of value could be given when there is a de facto as
well as a de jure impediment to the ordinary ability to compel a witness to testify. These considerations would
allow 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) to be reconciled with the Witness Relocation and Protection Act, which allows the
government to give benefits for the protection of government witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-28 (2000).
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of payments by the defense. Most importantly for present purposes, these consider-
ations would also apply to the use of witness payments by Milberg. Indeed, as
discussed in Part III, for this reason it is far from clear that such payments would
be prohibited.77
On the other hand, despite the "doomsday" rhetoric, it is far from clear that
Singleton I would have resulted in much prospective harm to prosecutors. One
possibility is that the court's approach may not stop the practice of leniency for
testimony, but rather make such promises implicit rather than explicit.7" Indeed,
under this system, the prosecutors or even defense attorneys could simply inform
defendants of the probable outcomes of their actions, including leniency by the
judge at sentencing.79 Such an outcome would reduce both judicial oversight and
the fairness of the process to defendants. For example, the accomplice witness,
when asked in court, could truthfully respond that he was not given consideration
in exchange for testimony, even when all parties expect this to be the case ex post."°
Such concerns are not speculative. For example, during the Enron trial, the star
witness for the prosecution was Andrew Fastow, who previously pled guilty to two
counts of wire fraud and agreed that his "guidelines sentence would include 120
months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons."8' At trial, Fastow testified that he
77. Indeed, one appellate court held that cash payments for testimony by a private litigant did not violate
18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) because it requires that payments constitute a bribe for false testimony. See Golden Door
Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass'n, 117 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1997).
The court seems to misapply its earlier holding in United States v. Moody, which held that 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(2) is not unconstitutionally vague, and that any person could reasonably conclude that the defen-
dant's actions, giving a bribe for false testimony, would be proscribed by the statute. 977 F.2d 1420, 1425 (11 th
Cir. 1992). The court did not hold that the statute required the payment to be for false testimony. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.3d 1119 (11 th
Cir. 1999).
78. See Bowman, supra note 75, at 37-39.
79. Id.
80. See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied
Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1129 (2004) (noting that implicit terms in plea agreements cause the same
concerns as explicit ones, but afford defendants fewer opportunities to challenge them); Eli Paul Mazur, Note,
Rational Expectations of Leniency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the Prosecutor's Role as a Minister of Justice, 51
DUKE L.J. 1333, 1355-60 (2002).
81. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Andrew S. Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2004),
available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.comlcnnldocs/enron/usafastowl 1404plea.pdf [hereinafter Fas-
tow Plea Agreement]. Fastow agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire fraud, and one count of mail and
securities wire fraud, each having a statutory prison term of zero to five years, which "will be imposed consecu-
tively." Id. The agreement states that
the parties agree that Defendant's sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines shall include 120 months
in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. Defendant agrees that he will not move for a downward
departure from the offense level of guideline range calculated by the Court and that no grounds for
downward departure exist.
Id. at 2-3. Moreover, the agreement states that the DO
is not obligated to and will not at any time in the future file any motion for a reduction in Defen-
dant's sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5KI .1, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 or Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 35, based on information provided by Defendant related directly or indirectly
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had no chance of a better deal for his testimony. 2 Fastow's claim that he was testi-
fying as a non-contingent witness certainly would be a key factor in the jury's
credibility assessment of him as a witness.83 However, at sentencing, Fastow, in
to Enron, any entity related to Enron, or any transaction involving Enron or any entity related to
Enron.
Id. at 6.
82. In the following exchange between the Enron Task Force prosecutor John Hueston and Fastow, the
prosecutor represents to the Lay-Skilling jury that Fastow had agreed to a floor of ten years of prison time:
Hueston: And was there a minimum sentence that you pleaded guilty to?
Fastow: My plea agreement states that I agree to a sentence of 10 years. [... 1.
During cross-examination, Skilling counsel Daniel Petrocelli followed up with the following:
Petrocelli: Okay. And you said you have to go to jail for 10 years; right?
Fastow: Well, my sentence is for 10 years. I could potentially have time off for good behavior....
Petrocelli: Okay. And the reason why you just answered my question in the way you did is because
you want to communicate to the jury that Mr. Skilling is a criminal along with you, correct?
Fastow: No, Mr. Petrocelli. I'm just trying to answer the questions honestly. My outcome is already
determined. [... I I'll be sentenced to ten years as far as I understand. It doesn't matter - my [sic]
sentence isn't affected by whether Mr. Skilling is convicted or not.
Finally, on re-direct examination by Hueston, Fastow testified as follows:
Hueston: And as a result of your pledge to cooperate, did you agree to plead guilty to a 10-year
minimum sentence of imprisonment?
Fastow: A 10-year maximum imprisonment.
Hueston: And what is the minimum amount of time that that plea agreement calls for?
Fastow: It calls for a 10-year sentence.
Hueston: So after January 14th, can your cooperation lower that 10 years?
Fastow: My understanding is that I will be sentenced to 10 years. The Judge ultimately has a [sic]
discretion; but in my plea agreement, I agreed to the 10-year sentence.
See More on the Fastow Sentence, http://blog.kir.comlarchives/003476.asp (Sept. 26, 2006 13:35 EST).
83. The following exchange also took place between Hueston and Fastow in response to questions during
cross examination regarding whether Fastow forged a key document:
Hueston: And after all this time, you found and turned over the document to the FBI, you
remembered, late May or June; is that right?
Fastow: I believe that's correct, yes.
Hueston: And you turned it over because you were cooperating?
Fastow: Yes, sir.
Hueston: And this is months after, six months after, you enter your plea of guilty; is that right?
Fastow: Approximately, yes, sir.
Hueston: And can this document lower your sentence now, under your understanding?
Fastow: My understanding is, no.
Hueston: And if, as the defense was suggesting, you were just falsely creating this document, wouldn't
it have been better to do so before you entered a plea of guilty, when you were bargaining with the
government?
Fastow: A. Well, one could argue that. [.
Hueston: Mr. Fastow, if as the defense suggests, you're on some sort of mission to say or do anything
to convict Jeff Skilling, might you have been tempted to just add a couple more initials to that Global
Galactic document?
Fastow: Sir, I have no incentive to add any initials. My incentive is to be truthful. If I'm not truthful, I
could go to prison for life. By making a document more compelling, I can't lower my sentence.
Hueston: By trying to do that, there's only one thing you're sentence would do; right? ... If you tried
to alter a document or tell a lie, there's only one direction that sentence can go?
Fastow: That's correct. That would be a lie. That means my sentence would go up, potentially, to a
life sentence.
Id.
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consideration of his cooperation, received a six-year sentence. No one, including
Prosecutor Hueston, brought up his earlier trial testimony to the contrary in the
sentencing hearing. 4 Nor did the prosecutor bring up the fact that the sentence
facially violated the plea agreement. Rather, Hueston was reported to have said that
Fastow's help had been "critical" in unraveling the Enron fraud and that without
Mr. Fastow "we would not have convicted Mr. Lay."85 The prosecutor also was
reported to have said that Fastow "appeared truly repentant," and despite the terms
of the plea agreement, did not object when a Fastow lawyer recommended a five-
year prison term. 6
This example further illustrates the potentially negative consequences of laws
that would prohibit payment to witnesses. The Enron prosecutor legally could have
agreed to recommend a four-year reduction for testimony. Instead, he explicitly
agreed not to do so. Yet he nevertheless chose not to disclose this at sentencing,
perhaps to avoid public criticism of the deal. The enforcement of laws against pay-
ing witnesses would significantly increase incentives for secret deals, thereby mak-
ing them the norm rather than the exception. The absence of full disclosure is
problematic for the same reasons non-disclosure of Milberg's payments to Vogel is
problematic-it prevents the court or jury from making a fully informed decision.
Moreover, the lack of disclosure by a prosecutor is more problematic given the high
value placed on avoiding false convictions of innocent defendants.
In light of the analysis in Part III that showed that incentive payments to lead
plaintiffs can improve efficiency, the lack of disclosure was the primary substantive
distinction between the secret Milberg payments to Vogel and the prosecutor's
open payments to Vogel through his plea agreement. The Fastow example raises the
question of how well the court can supervise these plea deals-a problem that
84. Indeed, Skilling's lawyer, Daniel M. Petrocelli, called Fastow's reduced sentence "disturbing," and at-
tacked Fastow and other government witnesses for misrepresenting at trial the sentence reductions they would
receive in exchange for their cooperation. See Carrie Johnson, Feeling 'Slap in the Face' After Fastow's Sentence,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2006, at DI.
85. See John R. Emshwiller, Enron: The Tale of Two Sentencings, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 19, 2006, at C3.
86. Id. In contrast, Jeff Skilling received a 292 month guidelines sentence (the lower end of guidelines
offense level forty sentence). The guidelines level calculation for Fastow would likely have been similar, and the
associated guidelines sentence would easily exceed the statutory maximum of ten years associated with two
counts of wire fraud. Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, section 2BI.I would be applied to Fastow
for his violations of wire fraud convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The base offense level would be six, under
section 2Bl.1(a)(2). There would be another eight level increase under sections 2B1.(b)(2) and (b)(12)(B)
(more that 250 victims and the endangerment of a publicly traded company with 1,000 or more employees)
and an additional two level increase under section 2B.I(b)(9) (for use of a "sophisticated means"). In the
Skilling sentencing, Judge Lake set investor loss at 80 million dollars, resulting in a twenty-four level increase in
the offense level under section 2B.l(b)(I). See Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ Law Blog, http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/10/23/skillings-sentence-24-years-4-months/ (Oct. 23, 2006, 15:44 EST). The resulting
offense level would be forty, which would result in guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. Thus, Fastow,
though precluded from asking for a downward departure in his plea agreement, almost certainly received a
below-guidelines sentence from Judge Hoyt.
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would be exacerbated by a rule that prohibited paying witnesses. s7 If the court can
not effectively supervise the giving of implicit deals, then there is not much differ-
ence between the prosecutor's actions and Milberg's payments to witnesses based
on disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
Commentators on the Milberg case have noted the irony and hypocrisy involved in
the case. However, the primary hypocrisy in this case is not the fact that Milberg
"prosecuted" many firms for engaging in "kickbacks" and concealing information.
Rather, the important hypocrisy is the fact that the prosecution seeks to prosecute
Milberg for paying witnesses while simultaneously using the same conduct, indeed
to the same person, to prosecute Milberg. This case illustrates the need to recon-
sider standards regarding incentive payments to litigants and witnesses. Any such
standard should be based upon analysis of the incentive effects of the payments,
and not based on a desire to encourage criminal actions or to discourage civil
actions. Indeed, it may be rational not to apply 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) to prosecu-
tors. But the same considerations would apply to the application of this statute to
defendants and their lawyers, as well as to evaluating restrictions on payments to
lead plaintiffs.
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
87. In the alternative, one could argue that the sentencing court in the Fastow case was the one who
exhibited "mercy" by giving him a six year sentence. Of course, one could also say that the federal court in a
class action controlled the attorney's fees.
